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Abstract 
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include the Grossman-Helpman, the Coe- Helpman and Rivera-Batiz-Romer models) two of 
which suggest that trade harms growth; the others predicting the opposite. 
 
JEL Classifications:  H32, P16 
Keywords:  trade and endogenous growth, heterogeneous firms, dynamic versus static 
efficiency. 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Globalisation Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful for comments and observations from Thomas Chaney, Jan Haaland, Gene 
Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, Wolfgang Keller, Tommaso Mancini, Marc Melitz, Virginia 
Di Nino, Toshi Okubo and seminar participants at Hitotsubashi University, LSE, University 
of Barcelona and at the 2005 CEPR European Workshop on International Trade. Two 
referees and the JIE editor Jon Eaton provided excellence advice which much improved the 
paper. 
Richard Baldwin is Professor of International Economics at the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva.  Frédéric Robert-Nicoud is an Associate with the Globalisation 
programme at the Centre for Economic Performance and a Lecturer in the Department of 
Geography and Environment, London School of Economics. 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
© R. E. Baldwin and F. Robert-Nicoud, submitted 2006 
 
ISBN 0 7530 2023 8 
 1 
Trade and growth with heterogeneous firms  
Richard E. Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Until the 1980s, trade theory assumed away intra-industry trade for convenience, but empirical 
evidence revealed that much of world trade was exactly of the assumed-away kind (Grubel and 
Lloyd 1975). In response, the so-called new trade theory (Helpman and Krugman 1985) 
incorporated imperfect competition and increasing returns to account for intra-industry trade. The 
modelling choices made by new trade theorists assumed away, again for convenience, differences 
among firms. Recent empirical evidence, however, shows that differences among firms are crucial 
to understanding world trade. For example, firm differences within sectors may be more 
pronounced than differences between sector averages, and most firms – even in traded-goods 
sectors – do not export at all (Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999a,b, 2001; Clerides, Lach and Tybout 
                                               
∗
 Submitted to JIE February 2005. This paper replaces a July 2004 draft written as a comment on Melitz (2003) for 
Econometrica. The (rejecting) referees’ critiques were that our 9 page comment was not fair to the literature, ignored 
welfare and omitted intuition. This draft redresses these faults and extends the analysis in several directions. 
 2 
1998, Aw, Chung, and Roberts 2000, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2004; see Tybout 2003 for a 
survey). In response, what might be called the ‘new new’ trade theory incorporated firm-level 
heterogeneity to account for the many of the new firm-level facts. The main theoretical papers in 
this rapidly expanding literature are Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003), 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Bernard, Redding and Schott (2004), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, 
and Schott (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2003), Yeaple (2005), Luttmer (2005a, b) and Chaney 
(2005).  
Our paper studies the growth effects of greater openness by embedding a heterogeneous-firms trade 
model in a series of product-innovation endogenous growth models (Grossman and Helpman 1989, 
1991, Romer 1986, 1990, Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991a, b, Coe and Helpman 1995, Dinopoulos 
and Segerstrom 1999a, b, Keller 2004). We show that openness may either slow or speed growth 
depending upon the impact of openness on the marginal cost of innovating. Since growth is too 
slow from a welfare perspective in our model (as usual in product-innovation models), there can be 
a tension between the dynamic and static welfare effects when greater openness slows growth. We 
show, however, that the overall welfare impact is unambiguously positive.  
To make these points as simply as possible, we work with a new-new trade model related to 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and a ‘portmanteau’ product-innovation growth model that 
includes as special cases Grossman and Helpman’s product innovation model (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991 chapter 4), Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s ‘lab-quipement’ model, as well as three other 
models. This task is made easier by the fact that these models are based on the well-known 
Helpman-Krugman trade model. Indeed, it is insightful to think of our model as the Krugman 
(1980) model with three important additions. First, we allow for knowledge spillovers in variety-
creation so that the cost of developing a new variety falls at the same pace as the value of 
introducing a new variety. This eliminates the mass of varieties from the equilibrium conditions 
with the growth rate of the mass of varieties taking its place as a key equilibrating variable; it also 
allows us to endogenise the growth rate. Second, we add heterogeneity in firms’ marginal 
production costs, using the Hopenhayn-Melitz variety generation/selection set-up where firms are 
randomly assigned a marginal cost after having paid a start-up cost. Third, we add sunk market-
entry cost as in the ‘hysteresis and trade’ literature (Baldwin 1988, Baldwin and Krugman 1989, 
Dixit 1989). The sunk costs of establishing a marketing ‘beachhead’ interact with the heterogeneous 
marginal costs to produce two types of active firms – firms that sell only locally and firms that 
export as well as sell locally.  
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The paper is organised in five sections after the introduction. The next two present the model 
(section 2) and work out the long-run growth path (section 3). The subsequent two sections work 
out the growth effects of greater openness (Section 4) and the welfare implications (Section 5). 
Section 6 presents our concluding remarks.   
2. A HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS TRADE MODEL WITH GROWTH 
The foundation of our model is the well-known Helpman-Krugman monopolistic competition 
model. We work with two identical nations, a single primary factor L, and a single Dixit-Stiglitz 
goods sector (‘manufactures’) with differentiated varieties that consumers view as symmetric. 
Competition takes the form of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition among firms facing iceberg 
trade costs. Each manufacturing firm’s production cost function is linear, involving a sunk, variety-
development cost (we denote this ‘start-up cost’ as FI where I is a mnemonic for ‘innovation’) and a 
constant marginal production cost (we denote the unit labour input coefficient as ‘a’). 
Manufacturing firms are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their marginal production 
cost. A typical firm’s ‘a’ is drawn from a density function G[a] whose support is 0 ≤ a ≤ a0. The 
firm learns its ‘a’ after it has paid the start-up cost, FI.  
Selling a new variety in a particular market also requires the firm to pay a sunk cost that reflects the 
cost of adapting the variety to market-specific standards, regulations and norms. These costs – 
which we refer to as ‘beachhead’ costs – may differ for locally produced varieties and imported 
varieties. The cost of establishing a ‘beachhead’ for locally made products is FD (D is a mnemonic 
for domestic) and FX for imported varieties (X is a mnemonic for exports).  
The three fixed costs – the start-up cost FI and the two beachhead costs FD and FX – involve units of 
‘knowledge’. The start-up cost requires κI units of knowledge, while adapting it to local and export 
market conditions requires κD units and κX units of knowledge, respectively. Thus: 
(1)   KXXKDDKII PFPFPF κκκ === ,,  
where PK is the price of a unit of knowledge (K for knowledge), and the κ’s are expressed in units 
of knowledge. Knowledge is created by a perfectly competitive ‘innovation sector’ (I-sector for 
short) and sold to potential entrants in the manufacturing sector.1 The I-sector produces knowledge 
using labour; its technology can be written implicitly as: 
                                               
1
 The Hopenhayn-Melitz approach folds variety development into manufacturing, but innovation is the engine of 
growth in our model, so we separate innovation and manufacturing by introducing an explicit innovation sector. 
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(2)   ],,[; nawcP
P
SQ K
K
K

==  
where QK is the flow of new knowledge (the I-sector’s output), and S is total spending on new 
knowledge (S is a mnemonic for savings since in equilibrium all savings goes to buy new 
knowledge). Competition ensures PK equals ],,[ nawc  which is the I-sector’s marginal cost 
function; its arguments are the price of labour w, the vector of all unit-input coefficients of 
manufactured varieties a , and the number (mass) of these varieties, n. This allows the cost of 
producing knowledge to be influenced by the cost of direct inputs (labour) as well as the general 
level of efficiency in the economy as captured by a  and n. The only restriction we impose at this 
point is that c[⋅] is homogenous of degree minus one in n due to technological spillovers. This 
means that the cost of knowledge falls as the I-sector learns from the experience of having made ‘n’ 
varieties (as usual in endogenous growth models). We leave c[⋅] implicit for the moment.  
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM 
This section works out the steady state growth rate and characterises the equilibrium distribution of 
firm-level productivity. We first work out the instantaneous equilibrium, i.e. the economy’s 
equilibrium at a point on the long-run growth path taking the growth rate as given. 
3.1. Instantaneous equilibrium 
Entry decisions are the fulcrum of this model and there are two types: 1) the start-up decision, and 
2) the two market-entry decisions. Although these are linked, we treat them in sequence. 
A firm that has already sunk its start-up cost will enter a particular market if the benefit of doing so 
exceeds the cost. The benefit of entering a market depends upon the firm’s anticipated sales and 
these, in turn, depend upon the firm’s marginal selling cost relative to that of its competitors. 
Relying on the standard logic of fixed costs, we can already anticipate that only firms with 
sufficiently low marginal costs will enjoy market shares that are high enough to justify sinking the 
beachhead costs. Since there are two beachhead costs (FX and FD) there will be two thresholds, one 
for domestic sales, which we denote as aD, and one for export sales, which we denote as aX. These 
two thresholds define three types of firms. The most efficient firms, i.e. those with the lowest unit 
labour requirements (a<aX) sell locally and also export (we call these X-types, short for export 
firms). The least efficient firms (a>aD) do not produce (we call these N-types, short for non-
producers). Firms with intermediate efficiency (aX<a<aD) will produce but only sell locally (we call 
these D-types, short for domestic firms). 
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To flesh out this intuition, we characterise the operating profit that firms would earn if they 
decided to enter a given market. Under Dixit-Stiglitz competition, firms find it optimal to charge a 
constant operating profit margin, 1/σ, where σ>1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among 
varieties.2 Thus the operating profit that a firm earns in a particular market equals the value of the 
firm’s sales times 1/σ, where the value of its sales are its market-specific market-share times total 
spending in the market, E.  
By symmetry, wages are equalised internationally, so taking labour as numeraire (w=1) and using 
well-known Dixit-Stiglitz results, firm-j’s price in its local market is aj /(1-1/σ). If it exports, its 
price in the export market is τaj /(1-1/σ), where τ≥1 represents the usual iceberg trade costs (τ units 
must be shipped to sell one unit in the export market). Thus, a firm’s market share as a function of 
its marginal selling cost is:  
(3) 10;][][;)1(][ 1
0
1
0
1
1
≤≡≤+== −−−
−
∫∫
σσσ
σ
τφφ XD a D
a
D aadGaaadGam
m
m
n
ms  
where ‘m’ is the firm’s marginal selling cost (‘a’ for local sales and τa for export sales), ‘n’ is the 
mass of firms, m is the weighted average of firms’ marginal selling costs in a particular market, and 
][ DaaG  is the conditional density function of the a’s for producing firms, i.e. a<aD.3 A critical 
parameter in our paper is the level of trade freeness (phi-ness); φ ranges from zero when trade is 
perfectly closed (τ=∞) to unity when trade is perfectly free (τ=1), thus trade gets freer as φ rises.  
Equation (3) is pivotal; five observations facilitate intuition and subsequent analysis: i) The ratio, 
m1-σ/ m , is a measure of the firm’s market-specific competitiveness, i.e. its marginal selling cost 
relative to an average of its competitors’ marginal selling costs; ii) A firm’s market share exceeds 
1/n to the extent its competitiveness is above average; iii) A firm’s market share (and thus its 
operating profit) increases as its marginal cost falls, ceteris paribus; iv) The average marginal 
selling costs, m , depends on the two cut-off marginal costs, aD and aX, and the distribution G; note 
that the geometric weights are negative (1<σ) so higher marginal costs lower m ; v) As the mass of 
active firms ‘n’ grows (as it will along the steady state growth path), the market shares of all 
existing firms decline in tandem and at the rate at which n grows.  
Cut-off conditions.    Given the sunk-ness of the beachhead costs, FD and FX, the relevant benefit 
of market entry is the present value of the market-specific operating profit. Defining the discount 
                                               
2
 See Guide to Calculations for details available on www.hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/ 
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rate as γ and using (3), firm-j’s benefit from entering its local and export market are, respectively, 
s[aj]E/σγ and φs[aj]E/σγ, where E is total spending on manufactured goods in each (symmetric) 
market. The market-entry cut-off conditions are thus: 
(4)  XKXDKD P
E
asPEas κ
σγ
φκ
σγ
== ][;][  
where aD and aX are the cut-off marginal costs for entering the local market and the export market 
respectively (D stands for domestic and X for export).  
Free entry condition.    A potential entrant to the manufacturing sector must pay FI to develop a 
new variety, learning the variety’s associated ‘a’ only after sinking FI. The potential entrant then 
decides whether to invest in the further knowledge that is necessary to enter the local market and 
the export market. Potential entrants that draw N-type varieties (a>aD) abandoned their project. 
Those lucky enough to get a<aD sink FD and FX, depending upon the revealed ‘a’. Plainly, the value 
of the resulting variety depends on its ‘a’. Calculating these values is easy, but not necessary.  
A firm’s start-up decision can be cast in terms of the expected present value of a ‘winning’ variety 
(winning in the sense that it is actually produced, i.e. is a D- or X-type). Because we focus on 
steady states, the ex ante likelihood of getting a winner with any particular ‘a’ is exactly the same as 
the actual distribution of a’s for winners already in the market. In other words, the expected 
operating profit of a winner must exactly match the average operating profit earned in the market. 
This average is E/σn because total operating profit worldwide equals 2E/σ (due to the constancy of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz operating profit margin) and the worldwide mass of varieties is 2n. Thus:4 
  Expected value of a ‘winner’ = 
γσ n
E
 
Of course, innovators do not come up with a winner every try; only new varieties with a<aD will be 
‘winners’. It is straightforward to calculate the expected fixed cost of getting a winner (i.e. 
developing a D or X type patent). The answer is: 
(5)  ][
1
][
][
;
D
I
D
X
XDK
aGaG
aG
PF κκκκκ ++≡≡  
                                                                                                                                                            
3
 Since only varieties with a<aD are produced, ][ DaaG  equals G[a]/G[aD]. See Melitz (2003) for a proof. 
4
 This ‘expected=observed’ result marks the steady state in any model with a memory-less firm-birth and death process. 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) use a similar approach.  
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Where F is the expected fixed cost, which depends upon the price of knowledge PK and the 
expected units of knowledge required to get a ‘winner.’ The first term in κ is the fixed cost for local 
sales – an expense that every winner incurs. The second term reflects the fact that a fraction of 
winners are X-types and so incur κX as well; G[aX]/G[aD] is the probability of being an X-type 
conditional on being a winner. The third right-hand term reflects the expected variety development 
cost, i.e. κI times the inverse probability of getting a winner on a random draw since, i.e. 1/G[aD] is 
the number of ‘tries’ needed to get a winner. 
The expected pure profit from developing a new variety is (E/σnγ - F ). Free entry drives this to 
zero, so the free entry condition for variety introduction is:5 
(6)    κ
γ
σ
KP
n
E
=
/
  
If we took the ratio of (E/σnγ) and PKκ , (6) would be Tobin’s q=1 equation since E/σnγ is akin to 
the expected stock market value and PKκ is the expected replacement cost. As we shall see, all 
growth effects of trade work through the replacement cost.6  
Since c[⋅] from (2) is homogeneous of degree minus one in n, we can use an ‘intensive form’ of PK, 
pK≡nPK. With this notation, the cut-off and free entry conditions, (4) and (6), are: 
(7) ]1,,[;,,
11
awcnPppEp
m
Ea
p
m
Ea
KKKXK
X
DK
D 
=≡===
−−
κ
γσ
κ
γσ
φ
κ
γσ
σσ
 
Observe that ‘n’ drops out of the three conditions (as it must if n is to continue rising forever on the 
growth path). In an endogenous growth model, the discount factor γ – which varies with the growth 
rate – adjusts as ‘n’ would in a no-growth model.  
3.2. Saving, investment and growth 
To finish our characterisation of the growth path, we need to address two further issues: the 
equilibrium discount rate, and the utility maximising division of income between consumption and 
saving/investment. To this end, we work with simple intertemporal preferences, namely: 
(8)  ( )
σ
σσρ ELYSEYdidDdtDeU
i it
t +=+===
−
Θ∈
−
∞
−
∫∫ ; ; ; ln
)/11/(1/11
0
 
                                                
5
 See Guide to Calculations for details of the correspondence between ours and the Melitz (2003) approach.  
6
 See the Guide to Calculations for details. 
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where ρ is the rate of pure time preference, D is the CES consumption composite, Θ is the (time-
varying) set of consumed varieties, and di is consumption of variety-i. Consumers divide income Y 
between current expenditure E and saving/investment S, where Y equals labour income, L, plus all 
manufacturing operating profit E/σ (I-sector profit is zero). Utility optimisation implies a 
transversality condition and the Euler equation7:  
(9)  ρ−= rEE /ɺ  
where ‘r’ is the rate of return on saving/investment. Expenditure on goods E equals income less 
spending on new units of knowledge, S. Since there are zero pure profits in the I-sector, S equals 
the value of inputs, i.e. labour employed in the I-sector, LI (recall w=1). Thus E=L+E/σ-LI, so: 
(10)  )/11(
/11
σ
σ
−−=⇔
−
−
= ELLLLE I
I
 
Thus determining the utility-maximising path of expenditure E also pins down the 
savings/investment path S=LI. The implied growth rate of ‘n’ given LI is: 
(11)  
n
ng
p
L
g
Q
n
K
IK ɺ
ɺ ≡=⇔= ;
κκ
 
where the first and second expressions are related by (2), S=LI and pK≡PKn; g is the growth rate of 
n. Note that a constant LI implies a constant growth in the mass of varieties n.  
Solving for the time-path of E.    The economy can be described as a dynamic system consisting 
of two differential equations, the Euler equation (9) and the growth of varieties equation (11). To 
solve these for the steady state, we must specify the state variable. Although the steady state is 
unaffected by the choice of state variables, the ease of calculation depends greatly on this choice. 
Following Baldwin and Forslid (1991), we choose LI as the state variable. The fruit of this choice is 
immediately apparent. First, r=ρ given expressions (9) and (10) and the fact that ILɺ =0 by definition 
of steady state.8 Moreover, if LI stops evolving, (11) tells us that g is constant along the steady-state 
growth path. The discount rate, γ, is simple to calculate, e.g. the present value of a D-type’s 
operating profit is: 
  
( ) 1
00
{ /( )}g t X De a E n m dt a a aρ σ σ
∞
− + − ≤ ≤∫  
                                                
7
 See the Guide to Calculations for details. 
8
 Note that this presumes the steady state exists and is stable in the relevant sense; see Guide to Calculations for details. 
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Where n0 is the initial n, and e-ρt reflects the fact that the consumer/owner requires a return of r=ρ 
in order to forego the consumption necessary to finance the creation of a new variety, and the term 
egt reflects the rate at which the new firm’s market share (and thus operating profit) declines due to 
the expansion of competitors as per (3) and (11). Solving the integral, the present value is a1-
σE/σn0γ m  where γ=ρ+g. Intuitively, the gross discount rate γ reflects pure time preference ρ and 
the rate at which the typical variety’s market share falls, namely g.  
Summarising, expenditure E, savings/investment S=LI, the growth rate of varieties g, and the 
discount rate γ are time-invariant along the steady state growth path. The dynamic system therefore 
reduces to three equations – the two cut-off conditions and the free entry condition – with three 
unknowns, g, aD and aX. The only thing left to find is the utility maximising level of E.  
Using (10), (11), and the third expression in (7) yields the intuitive result that the utility-maximising 
E equals ‘permanent income’, i.e. the income from labour L plus the rental rate on the steady-state 
value of the nation’s capital stock (which equals pKκ ):9 
   κρ KpLE +=   
Using this and γ=ρ+g in (7), the cutoff and free entry conditions are:  
(12)  κ
ρσ
κρ
κ
ρσ
κρφ
κ
ρσ
κρ σσ
K
K
XK
KX
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p
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p
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=
+
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=
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=
+
+ −−
)(,)(
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,)(
)( 11
 
These three expressions implicitly define the three equilibrating variables, aD, aX and g. 
3.3. Discussion of the growth path 
The growth path in our model shares many similarities with the growth path of the canonical 
Grossman-Helpman product-innovation growth model that assumes homogenous varieties. The 
long-run growth path is characterised by a time-invariant division of labour between the production 
of capital goods (knowledge in our model) and consumption goods; the division is LI versus L-LI. 
The constant application of LI to knowledge creation yields a steadily rising mass of varieties due to 
the learning curve assumed in the I-sector, c[⋅]. Observe that ‘g’ here is the equilibrating variable 
much as ‘n’ is in no-growth homogenous firm trade (HFT hereafter) models, like Melitz (2003). 
Because knowledge spillovers remove n from the calculation, it is the speed of innovation that 
ensures zero expected pure profit from variety introduction. The economic logic is that a faster 
                                                
9
 From (6), the present value of all varieties, namely E/σγ, equals pK κ , since pK=nPK.  
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growth of n drives down the expected benefit of introducing a new variety since it boosts the rate 
at which innovators expect the operating profit of a new variety to decline as per (3).  
The constant flow of new varieties together with the time invariant employment of labour in the 
production of consumption goods means that consumption/production of each variety continuously 
declines at a rate of g. The representative consumer sees her real consumption, E/P, rise at:  
(13)  
1−
=
σ
ggC   
where gC is the growth rate of real consumption.10 In the working paper version of our paper 
(Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2005), we proved that the laissez-faire mass of varieties and cut-off 
points along the steady-state growth path are socially optimal, but the laissez-faire growth rate is too 
low from the planner’s perspective.  
4. GROWTH EFFECTS OF MARKET OPENNING  
Solving the third expression in (12):  
(14)   
σ
σρ
κ
σ )1(/ −
−=
Kp
Lg  
Since everything here is a parameter except pKκ , all growth effects of trade must come through the 
expected sunk cost of getting a new variety, i.e. the denominator of Tobin’s q. Thus: 
Result 1 : Closer international economic integration is pro-growth if and only if it lowers the 
expected sunk cost of developing a new, produced variety (namely, pKκ ). This allows us to 
define two growth-effect channels: the pK-channel and the κ -channel. 
4.1. Pro- and anti-growth effects 
Anti-growth.    As it turns out, the κ -channel is unambiguously anti-growth since the expected 
sunk cost of getting a ‘winner’ rises with freer trade. Intuitively, freer trade makes it easier to 
export, so the threshold marginal cost for exporting, aX, rises. The increased competition from 
imports makes both markets more competitive and this lowers the common aD (the extra 
competition induces the least efficient D-type firms to cease production). From the definition of κ  
in (5), this means that the typical winner is more likely to be an X-type and a successful entry will 
require more tries before getting a winner; both factors raise κ .11 In short trade may be anti-growth 
since it raises the fixed knowledge-requirement of new varieties conditional on entry. 
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 This follows from the fact that the ideal CES price index is P={(n m )1/(1-σ)}/ (1-1/σ). 
11
 See Melitz (2003) for proof with a general G; below we demonstrate this for a specific functional form. 
 11 
Pro-growth.    Freer trade in goods and ideas may alter the price of new knowledge, pK. We 
cannot be more precise without an explicit functional form for ],,[ nawc  , but two well-known 
economic mechanisms suggest that the pK-channel will usually be pro-growth. One concerns the 
price-lowering impact of freer trade on goods prices and the indirect impact of this on pK when the 
knowledge-producing sector uses intermediate inputs – ‘lab equipment.’ An entirely separate line of 
reasoning concerns international knowledge spillovers. If tighter integration makes the flow of ideas 
freer then we would expect learning in each nation to have a greater cost-lowering impact in both 
nations and this would show up in a lower pK.  
4.2. Analytic solutions and microfoundations for I-sector technology 
Analysis up to this point has been conducted without resort to a functional form for G. Much of the 
subsequent analysis can also be conducted in this manner, but the reasoning is clearer with explicit 
solutions for aD, aX and g. We assume a Pareto distribution: 
(15)   10)/(][ 00 ≡≤≤= aaaaaG k  
where k and a0 are the ‘shape’ and ‘scale’ parameters, respectively. By choice of units, a0 is 
normalised to unity without loss of generality. With (15), we solve m  and κ , so  (12) yields:12 
(16)  
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where pK= ]1,,1[ ac  , )1/()1( −Ω+= ββκκ D  and13 
  1)1/(,/,1 >−≡≡≡Ω − σβκκφ ββ kTT DX  
Omega as a measure of openness.    Ω (a mnemonic for ‘openness’) is a Cobb-Douglas average of 
the two types of trade barriers in the HFT model, variable trade cost (as measured by freeness φ) 
and fixed trade costs (as measured by the excessive beachhead cost facing imported varieties, 
namely T≡FX/FD). Ω displays several convenient features. It combines the protective effects of 
fixed and variable trade costs, and it is bound between zero and unity with zero indicating autarky 
and unity indicating free trade.  
4.2.1. Microfoundations for the I-sector marginal cost function 
                                               
12
 Specifically, ββ κκββ )/()}1/()1{( 1 IDm +−Ω+= .  
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 The restriction β>1 ensures the integrals converge. 
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The strength of the pK-channel depends upon ]1,,[ awc  . Five special cases are considered. 14 
Grossman-Helpman model.    The canonical Grossman-Helpman product-innovation model 
assumes a learning curve where the marginal cost of creating knowledge falls as the I-sector’s 
cumulative production, n, rises. Specifically: 
(17)  )1)(1(
)1(
*
],,[ λβ
βκ
κλ +−
Ω+
=⇒
+
=
D
Kp
nn
w
nawc

 
where 0≤λ≤1 (lambda is a mnemonic for ‘learning’) measures the international dimension of 
spillovers; this is for the Home nation, but the Foreign nation’s is identical since n=n* by 
symmetry. (The original Grossman-Helpman version considered the extremes of no and perfect 
spillovers, i.e. λ=0 and λ=1.) Many justifications of this intertemporal externality are possible. 
Romer (1990) rationalizes it by referring to the non-rival nature of knowledge. Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) assert that it reflects the impact of ‘public knowledge’ that is created automatically 
along with the private, patentable knowledge that leads to new varieties. 
Coe-Helpman model.    A variant of (17) makes λ a function of trade flows by equating λ to the 
fraction of foreign varieties that are imported, namely (aX/aD)k, i.e.: 
(18)  ( ) )/1)(1(
)1(/~
T
paa DK
k
DX Ω+−
Ω+
=⇒≡ β
βκ
κλ  
where λ~ replaces λ in (17). Coe and Helpman (1995) provide empirical evidence that knowledge 
spillovers are related to trade flows; see Keller (2002) for a critique. 
Efficiency-linked knowledge spillovers.    Expression (17) assumes that I-sector learning is equal 
for all varieties (the impact on pK is the same for X- and D-types). An alternative is to assume that 
the extent of the spillovers is proportional to the average efficiency of the produced varieties, so the 
n’s are weighted by the average marginal cost m and *m . Noting n=n* and *mm = : 
(19)  1
{( 1) }[ , , ] ( * *) / 2 (1 )
I
K
D
w
c w a n p
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β β
β κ
κ
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−
= ⇒ =
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
  
Reverse engineering.    The three previous special cases treat I-sector learning as proportional to 
the number of varieties the sector has produced. Varieties, however, contain different units of 
knowledge depending upon their export status. The average number of knowledge units in a locally 
produced variety is κ , as per (5), but it is higher for an imported variety, namely κD+κX+κI . 
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Presuming that the local I-sector only learns from varieties that it can actually purchase (the idea 
being only these can be ‘reverse engineered’), ],,[ nawc   would be: 
(20) 
1( 1)[ , , ] 1 (1 )*
X
K
X
w
c w a n p
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β κ
κ βκ λ κ
−
 − Ω
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
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where Xκ  equals IXD κκκ ++  and λ
~
 is from (18); again n=n*.  
Lab-equipment model.    Another well-known product-innovation model, Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991), supposes that knowledge is produced using the final good CES composite, so:15 
(21) 
1
1 ( 1) )[ , , ] ; ( ) , 1 (1 )
I
K D
D
c w a n P P nm p
β
α σ
β κ
α σ κ κ
κ
−
 
−
= = = − ⇒ =  
+ Ω 

 
where P is the CES price index, and the restriction on α is implied by our homogeneity assumption 
on ],,[ nawc  . This provides microfoundations for a connection between the cost of goods and the 
productivity of the knowledge creating sector.16 Plainly, these five special cases could be mixed and 
matched to create a wide range of possibilities.  
4.3. Autarky to Free Trade liberalisation 
The product Kpκ  is the pivot for growth effects, as per Result 1. Having worked out the analytic 
solutions for Kpκ  in the five cases, evaluation of the growth effects of freer trade is straightforward. 
We start with a base-case comparison of two conceptual extremes, complete autarky and complete 
integration. When nations are autarkic in terms of the flow of goods and ideas, Ω=λ=1/T=0; when 
they are fully integrated Ω=λ=T=1.  
The Grossman-Helpman and Coe-Helpman models display the same growth rate in the two 
conceptual extremes. Intuitively, this is because the shift to full goods-market openness (Ω=0 to 
Ω=1) increases the amount of knowledge per variety, κ , by exactly the same amount that the 
increase in ideas-openness (λ=0 to λ=1) lowers the per-unit price of knowledge. This result does 
not hold for the other models of innovation, the efficiency-linked, reverse-engineering and lab-
equipment models. In these models zero-to-full integration is pro-growth. The stark contrast in 
results is due to the connection between manufacturing-sector average productivity and innovation- 
sector productivity. In the Grossman-Helpman and Coe-Helpman models there is no direct 
connection while there is in the other three models, so the well-known productivity enhancing 
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effects of liberalisation in the HFT models (so-called shifting and sorting effects) stimulate 
innovation in the latter but not the former. Next, consider marginal changes in integration. 
4.4. The growth effect of freer trade in goods and ideas 
The term Kpκ is the pivot for growth effects, but observe that all ambiguity of growth effects stems 
from the pK-channel. In all five cases, φκ dd /  equals {βκD/(β-1)}(dΩ/dφ)>0, so the κ -channel is 
unambiguously anti-growth. If the overall effect is positive, it must be that the pK-channel is pro-
growth and sufficiently strong to overwhelm the negative κ -channel effect. We consider freer trade 
with respect to variable trade costs (i.e. dφ>0), with respect to fixed trade costs (i.e. dT<0), and with 
respect to trade in ideas, (i.e. dλ>0). 
Lower variable trade-costs.    Reducing iceberg trade costs tends to slow growth in two cases, 
speeding it in three cases. Given Result 1, Ω≡φβT1-β and the simple analytic solutions in (17)-(21), 
the proofs are by inspection of the relevant expression for κKp . 
• Under the expression (17) knowledge-creating technology (Grossman-Helpman), dφ>0 has 
no impact on pK, so the pK-channel does nothing to offset the negative κ -channel effect. The 
overall impact is therefore anti-growth (our working paper version, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 
2005, discusses this case at length).  
• Under the expression (18) knowledge-creating technology (Coe-Helpman), the pK-channel is 
positive, but it is not sufficiently large to offset the negative κ -channel effect unless T=1 in which 
case the net growth effect is zero (NB: T=1 implies the beachhead cost is the same for a local and 
imported variety).  
• Under the expression (19) knowledge-creating technology (efficiency-linked spillovers), the 
pK-channel is positive. It is also strong enough to overcome the anti-growth κ -channel. Formally, 
the result can be seen by inspection of (19). Intuitively, the pro-growth pK-channel is driven by the 
productivity enhancing impact of freer trade, which is in turn driven by a selection effect (weaker 
firms are eliminated and more firms export) and a share-shifting effect (the market shares of the 
most efficient firms rise while those of inefficient firms falls). The anti-growth effect, however, is 
driven by the selection effect alone (i.e. d(aX)>0 and d(aD)<0) and so it is weaker.  
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• Under the expression (20) knowledge-creating technology (reverse engineering), the pK-
channel is positive. It dominates the anti-growth κ -channel, so the overall effect is pro-growth as 
inspection of (20) reveals. Intuitively, we can think of this as the Coe-Helpman model with an extra 
fillip for international knowledge spillovers. This extra fillip is due to the fact that imported 
varieties systematically ‘embody’ more knowledge since they have been adapted to meet the 
beachhead costs in both markets, while some of the locally-produced varieties embody only κI and 
κD units of knowledge. Notice that this extra effect is strong enough to overcome the anti-growth 
κ -channel even when T is very large but finite.  
• Under the expression (21) knowledge-creating technology (lab-equipment), the pK-channel 
is positive and strong enough to overcome the fact that freer trade raises the expected sunk cost of 
getting a ‘winner.’ As in the efficiency-linked-spillovers model, the result is due to the powerful, 
pro-efficiency impact of freer trade in the HFT model.  
Lower fixed trade-costs.    Reducing FX to the level of FD (i.e. dT<0) has qualitatively identical 
effects on growth as dφ>0 in three of the five cases since T and φ appear bundled in Ω. These are 
the cases where the degree of international spillovers, λ. is exogenous, viz. (17), (19) and (21). 
When the international spillovers parameter λ is linked to the fraction of foreign varieties that are 
traded, then T has an independent effect on growth since this fraction is a function of T, i.e. from 
(16) and the definition of λ~ , we have T/~ Ω=λ . It is easy to show that taking account of the T 
inside Ω and the explicit T in the models where λ is endogenous, i.e. (18) and (20), lower fixed 
barriers to trade is always pro-growth. The intuition is obvious. Since lower T encourages spillovers 
by increasing the fraction of traded varieties, it tends to be pro-growth and this only adds to the pro-
growth effect from dΩ>0.  
Higher knowledge spillovers.    It is plain that raising the exogenous λ in isolation is pro-growth 
since it lowers the expected cost of getting a ‘winner’ without any direct impact on the reward to 
getting a ‘winner.’ In the Grossman-Helpman model, openness to ideas, λ, opposes openness to 
goods, Ω, such that they cancel if they are equal, viz. λ=Ω; in this case, greater openness has no 
impact on growth. 
4.5. The Role of Heterogeneity and beachhead costs  
 16 
The role of heterogeneity and beachhead effects in trade and growth links are quite obvious.17 If 
the beachhead costs are eliminated, integration has no impact on the range of varieties and so the 
κ -channel is eliminated; it turns λ~ , m , κ  and Xκ into parameters. It also eliminates most of the 
effects on the pK-channel. Changes in the exogenous learning spillovers (as measured by λ) still 
effect growth, and the price lowering impact of integration feeds directly into pK in the lab-
equipment model. Note that when T=FX/FD=1 the growth effects of freer-trade (in the traditional 
iceberg sense) are unchanged, except for the Coe-Helpman model. In this case, T=1 implies the 
anti-growth κ -channel exactly offsets the pro-growth pK-channel. 
4.6. Static versus dynamic productivity effects 
A major finding of heterogeneous-firms trade theory is that trade openness can raise productivity 
via selection and share-shifting effects (Melitz 2003). Defining ‘measured productivity’ as the ratio 
of real manufacture output to manufacturing labour input, we note that openness also boosts 
productivity in our model since greater openness lowers the ideal CES price index. However, in 
cases such as (17), openness slows the rate at which the price index falls and so slows the rate of 
productivity improvement. This implies that there may be tension between the static and dynamic 
productivity effects of trade in an HFT model.   
5. WELFARE 
Most of the welfare issues in our model are simple. The present value of utility on the equilibrium 
growth path at time t=0 is U0=E/P0(ρ+g). Using the permanent income expression for E, P from 
(21), and the analytic solution for m , we have: 
(22)  
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The first term in parentheses reflects the dynamic welfare aspects, i.e. U0=E/(ρ+g), and the second 
captures the static aspects, i.e.1/P0. Plainly greater openness (i.e. dΩ>0) always produces positive 
static effects. The sign of the dynamic normative effects of greater openness balance on the same 
fulcrum as did the positive effects, namely pKκ .  
Indeed, the decentralised growth rate g is suboptimal from a welfare perspective because innovators 
do not internalise the positive dynamic (learning) externalities they exert on future innovations (see 
Grossman and Helpman 1991 and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2005). As a result, any policy that 
                                               
17
 See our working paper version for the mathematical details.  
 17 
raises growth reduces the gap between the market growth rate and the desirable one is welfare 
improving in a dynamic sense. To summarise: 
Result 2: The static welfare effect of greater openness is always positive; since laissez-faire 
growth is sub-optimal from the social-welfare perspective, the dynamic welfare effect is 
positive if and only if greater openness raises the growth rate. Given Result 1, this means that 
a sufficient condition for greater openness to be welfare enhancing is that greater openness 
lowers the expected cost of a new produced variety, namely Kp κ .  
Thus for 3 of the 5 special cases for I-sector technology, namely (19), (20) and (21, we can say the 
welfare effects are unambiguously positive, given the analysis in Section 4. Welfare ambiguity 
arises when openness is anti-growth since it creates a tension between welfare-enhancing static 
effects and welfare-worsening dynamic effects. In the Grossman-Helpman case in which openness 
is the most strongly anti-growth: 
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By inspection, this is unambiguously increasing in openness as measured by λ and as measured by 
Ω as well only if σ is small enough; in such cases, openness raise welfare despite the negative 
impact on growth. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper explores the growth effects of trade when firms are heterogeneous and face sunk market-
entry costs. Our findings can be viewed as speaking to the trade and growth literature on one hand, 
and the new-new trade theory on the other. As far as trade and growth is concerned, our main 
finding - that freer trade has an ambiguous impact on growth - contrasts with most findings in the 
homogeneous-firms endogenous growth literature where positive effects are the standard result; this 
ambiguous finding squares better with the empirical evidence on the effects of trade openness on 
growth (see Berg and Krueger, 2003, for a survey). Specifically, our model stresses the need for 
empirical researchers to better investigate the link between trade and the dissemination of 
knowledge, in particular its impact on the efficiency of the innovation sector. As far as the new-new 
trade theory is concerned, our main finding is that there is tension between static and dynamic 
productivity effects. Although freer trade improves industry productivity in a level sense, it may 
harm it in a growth sense, at least when ideal price indices are used to measure real output. 
 18 
One line of research that would be interesting would be to explore the impact of unilateral trade 
liberalisation. However, this analysis becomes very involved, so we leave this for future research. 
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Guide to Calculations by Footnote: 
“Trade and growth with heterogeneous firms” 
(not for publication, will be posted on the web) 
Richard E. Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
 
2. The constant operating profit mark-up follows directly from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz result of 
constant cost-price mark-up; for example, rearranging the first order condition for local 
sales, ( ) a=σ1-1p  we get that operating profit earned on local sales is ( ) σpcca-p = , where c 
is local sales. 
5. The direct approach to formulating the condition for zero-expected-profit-from-innovation is to 
calculate the expected benefit net of market entry costs, i.e. 
∫ ∫ −+−
−−
D Xa a
XD adGFnmEaadGFnmEa0 0
11 ][})/({][})/({ γσφγσ σσ , which simplifies to 
(E/ nmγσ )(A[aD]+φA[aX]) minus (G[aD]FD +G[aX]FX), where ∫ −≡ x adGaxA 0 1 ][][ σ . Notice, 
however, that (3) implies G[aD] =(A[aD]+φA[aX])/ m , the benefit less market-entry costs is 
G[aD](E/nσγ)-G[aD]FD -G[aX]FX. This is set equal to FI in the direct approach. Dividing this 
through by G[aD] validates our indirect approach in (6). We adopt the indirect approach 
since it allows us to deal more clearly with growth and corresponds more closely to Tobin’s 
insightful approach to characterising investment in a general equilibrium setting. It also 
allows a direct comparison with standard endogenous growth models (which do not have 
market-entry costs) and it facilitates analysis of growth effects by concentrating the impact 
of openness and parameter changes in the expected cost of getting a winner. 
6. See Baldwin and Forslid (2000), Proposition 1 for a general proof that the direct impact on 
Tobin’s q is a sufficient statistic for growth effects in this sort of model. Intuitively, this is 
obvious since anything that raise Tobin’s q encourages more investment and this, in an 
endogenous growth model, results in faster growth. The faster growth, in turn, returns 
Tobin’s q back to its steady state value of unity. All the variables in the numerator of 
Tobin’s q are either endogenous (e.g. E) or are parameters unrelated to trade liberalisation. 
7. Formally, income is L+rW, where W is wealth, r is the rate of return, andWɺ =L+rW-E describes 
wealth accumulation. The Hamiltonian is e-ρtln(E/P)+ ω(L+rW-E) and r and the path of P is 
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exogenous to the consumer/saver. The necessary conditions are e-ρt/E=ω and -ωr=ωɺ  plus 
a transversality condition. Manipulation involving the time derivative of the first condition 
and substitution of the second condition yields the Euler equation. 
8. The two differential equations are: 
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Doing a standard change-of-variables transformation, we take LI and nng /ɺ≡  as the state variables 
and, using (10), the system becomes: 
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As usual, changing state variables has no impact on the system dynamics. As is well know from 
decades of growth models, this system is saddle path stable. Also, as in most endogenous 
growth models, there is no transitional dynamics since the saddle path is a point, namely the 
steady state equilibrium. The system jumps immediately to the steady state since otherwise 
the system would violate the transversality conditions. All these assertions are proved at 
great length and generality in Grossman and Helpman (1991) and other textbooks on 
growth. The exact proof in this case can be found in Baldwin and Forslid (2000) which uses 
Tobin’s q approach to evaluate the growth effects of trade in a homogenous goods model.   
Our use of ‘state variable’ is somewhat unconventional in the standard terminology of economic 
dynamics (where state variable means a non-jumper and co-state and control variables are 
jumpers). Mathematically speaking, the state vector is the set of variables defines the state of 
the system fully. This includes variables that can jump or only move smoothly. Thus what 
economists usually call control variables, co-state variable and state variables are, 
mathematically speaking, all state variables. After all, one needs to know them all in order to 
fully characterise the state of the system. For example, in the simple differential equation 
xx ρ=ɺ  x is the state variable whether it is a jumper or not. The trick of taking L as 
numeraire and LI as a state variable opens the door to the intuitive simplification of working 
with the static economy representation of the dynamic path, i.e. focusing on the share of 
primary resources devoted to creation of new ‘capital’ and the creation of consumption 
goods. Anything that raises the share of L devoted to capital (i.e. knowledge in our model) 
creation is pro-growth.  
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